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One of the most striking features of Singapore’s migrant worker landscape is how often recruitment is done through informal relationships rather than law-compliant, formal channels. These informal, often multi-layered channels are rife with misrepresentation and high fees.

Workers are often promised specific salaries, work conditions or job scopes. Yet upon arrival, they discover that the true salary or nature of the job differs substantially from what had been represented to them. When disputes subsequently arise, employers frequently deny responsibility on the basis that the relevant representations were made by independent “agents” rather than by the company itself. The intermediaries meanwhile become uncontactable, deny responsibility, or claim merely to have relayed information, leaving the workers with no recourse.

What results is a significant accountability gap within migrant worker recruitment systems, where employers often benefit from extensive intermediary recruitment networks while simultaneously distancing themselves from responsibility for the representations made through those same networks.

This paper explores whether the legal doctrine of agency may provide a means of bridging this gap by legally attributing the promises of recruitment intermediaries to employers.

The legal significance of establishing an agency relationship is substantial. Once established that the intermediary had the authority to act on behalf of a principal, the intermediary’s acts and representations may legally bind the principal. In the migrant worker context, this may potentially overcome the accountability problem where employers refuse to take responsibility for promises made during recruitment by claiming that these statements were made only by informal intermediaries without authorisation.

The study drew upon interviews conducted with 18 migrant workers employed in Singapore. They were mostly from Bangladesh, but also from Myanmar and China. The interviews focused on the workers’ recruitment experiences, including how employment was secured, the role played by intermediaries, the representations made regarding salary and job scope, the payment of recruitment-related sums, and the extent of direct contact with employers. These interviews were qualitative in nature and four of them were used as case studies for deeper legal analysis.

We found that in all the cases examined, it would still prove difficult to establish an agency relationship to the satisfaction of the law. The lack of transparency as to the actors’ credentials and the relationships among them, the lack of documentation as to what assurances were given, make for huge disadvantages for the worker seeking redress when he or she later realises that the terms of employment were not what had been described.

Yet, both misrepresentation at recruitment and the charging of fees are considered by the International Labour Organisation as serious indicators of forced labour (see our article Forced labour in Singapore – a scorecard). Interestingly, at the 2026 Universal Periodic Review, Singapore supported the recommendation from South Africa that we “consider broadening the definition of trafficking to align with the ILO indicators of forced labour, and provide stronger victim-centred protections for cases of forced labour (recommendation 30.125)”.

It should therefore be timely to see how we can address these issues.

Our paper concludes that whilst agency law doctrines may serve as a possible tool for attributing responsibility in some cases, civil litigation alone is unlikely to adequately address the systematic issues behind these disputes. Structural reform aimed at reducing the opacity and intermediary dependence embedded within the existing recruitment process itself should be the way forward.

TWC2’s proposal is to establish a centralised recruitment and job-matching system. Under such a system, all Work Permit vacancies could be required to be openly advertised through a central government-managed platform, with job applications, interviews, contract signing and IPA issuance conducted directly through the platform itself. Existing migrant workers already in Singapore could apply directly for jobs through authenticated SingPass-linked accounts without requiring informal intermediaries to facilitate communication with employers. For prospective migrant workers outside Singapore, a system can be set up to issue them time-delimited logins – subject to certain qualifying conditions, including prior skills training – so that they too can participate in job search through the platform.

Such a structural change would directly address many of the agency-related difficulties identified in this study:

  • informational asymmetry that disadvantages workers,
  • clarity about who truly represents the employer,
  • clearer evidential trail as to promised terms of employment, and
  • a choking off of opportunities for charging unwarranted agent fees.

The full paper (PDF, 26 pages) can be downloaded by clicking the icon at right.